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Abstract
This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject
to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a
homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to
realize a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are prod-
uct specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation
by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established
product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements)
and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accu-
mulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D
cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce
the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition
and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In
addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates
first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its
temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the
result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong
complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D
cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D
competition.
1 Introduction
The overall aim of this paper is to develop and exploit a dynamic framework
of analysis that allows studying the optimal product development, the choice
between competition and cooperation in R&D, and investment strategies of
oligopolistic firms under consideration of the uncertainty about future changes
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in the market structure. The considered changes in the market structure are
due to changes in the range of products offered on the market triggered by
product innovations of incumbent firms. The considered market environment
captures in a stylized way the dynamic emergence of new submarkets as can
be observed repeatedly in established oligopolistic markets. For example, pro-
ducers of personal computers developed new related submarkets by introducing
portable MP3 players starting in the early 2000s or tablet PCs in 2010. In both
submarkets the major competitors are established producers of PCs and the new
products influence demand for PCs, where in case of MP3 players the relation-
ship is complementary, whereas tablet PCs are substitutes1. Other examples
include the TV industry, where major producers of standard CRT television
sets have started the production of flatscreens around the year 2000, and the
(time-phased) introduction of hybrid cars by many car manufacturers, which
opened a new submarket in this industry co-existing with the established ones.
The question whether innovation projects should be carried out in cooper-
ation with partners, including competitors on the market, is a key issue and
has attracted substantial interest from a theoretical (e.g. D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) or Choi (1993)) and an empirical perspective (e.g. Hagedoorn
(2002), Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006)). Also in the industries mentioned
above examples for cooperation, like the Global Hybrid Cooperation (GM and
Daimler) for the development of hybrid cars, the cooperation between Sony and
Samsung for the development of TFT-LCD screens, or a cooperation between
Lenovo and NEC to develop tablet computers play an important role. On the
other hand, several of the innovations opening new submarkets in these indus-
tries were introduced by incumbents who did not engage in R&D cooperation.
In order to capture the main implications of R&D cooperations in industry
settings like the ones discussed above, a dynamic framework is needed2, which
takes into account that firms potentially involved in R&D cooperations are at the
same time competitors on the established product markets. In particular, they
should realize that the introduction of new products will affect profitability of
their current product range. Existing theoretical studies of incentives for R&D
cooperations typically are not dynamic and/or do not study interdependencies
with existing products.
This paper attempts to fill this gap. To do so, we consider a dynamic
oligopoly model, where incumbent firms offer an established homogeneous prod-
uct. At some ex-ante unknown point in time the range of products is enlarged,
because one or several of the competing firms obtain the option to introduce a
new product, which is vertically and horizontally differentiated from the exist-
ing product. Capacities cannot be (fully) transferred between the production of
1To illustrate, one of the main producers on the PC and tablet market, Samsung Electron-
ics, stated that it expects the global personal computer market to shrink by 5 percent in 2013
as consumer demand continues to shift to mobile devices such as tablet computers (see India
Times (2013))
2The importance of a dynamic perspective on oligopoly markets has been stressed in Cabral
(2012, p.278), who argues that, ”... dynamic oligopoly models are an area where much work
needs to be done and much work can be done.”, and further, ”... dynamic oligopoly model
provide considerable value added with respect to static models.”
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different products, and therefore the introduction of the new product reduces
(in case of substitutes) or increases (in case of complements) the value of the
existing capacities. The firms’ objectives are to maximize their total discounted
profits by optimally selecting their investments in production capacities for the
different products they offer. Firms can enter an R&D cooperation with the
competitor in order to develop the new product. Entering such a cooperation
reduces the expected time till the firm can introduce the new product because
the firm gets access to the R&D results of the partner and the cooperation
might also generate synergies in the R&D activities (see e.g. Link et al. (1996)
or Link(1998) for empirical evidence for the existence of synergies in R&D coop-
erations). The drawback of such a cooperation is that the partner will be able to
introduce the new product at the same time, thereby intensifying competition.
The developed model has the form of a piecewise deterministic differential
game with different modes. In the initial mode none of the firms has introduced
the new product. Any introduction of new products results in a switch to a new
mode opening a broader range of investment possibilities for the innovating firm.
To our knowledge this is the first paper to study dynamic strategic interactions
in an oligopoly where the product range evolves and also the first use of a
multi-mode game in the field of Industrial Organization.
Using this framework we address the following main research questions:
• Under which circumstances is it profitable for firms to cooperate in the
product innovation project?
• How does the anticipation of the emergence of a new sub-market affect
capacity dynamics of both firms prior to the innovation?
• How is the build-up of capacities after the emergence of the new sub-
market influenced by cooperation/non-cooperation in the innovation project?
• How do the answers to the questions above depend on the degree of sub-
stitutability between the established and the new product?
Characterizing Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of the game leads to the
following answers. Although the model abstracts from explicit cooperation costs
and knowledge spillover considerations, R&D cooperation has implicit costs due
to strategic interactions on the market. We identify two main effects responsible
for these costs: i) R&D cooperation implies that after a successful innovation
the new product is available for market introduction to all cooperation part-
ners. Hence, market competition emerges immediately after the introduction
of the new product (we denote this as the synchronization effect). ii) In case
the new product is a complement to the established one, the anticipation of
the eventual introduction of the new product induces an investment increase in
capacities of the established product already prior to the new product intro-
duction. The increased investment brings the price for the established product
closer to the competitive level, thereby reducing firm profits. This anticipation
effect is stronger if firms cooperate in R&D, since the innovation is accelerated.
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This results in additional implicit costs of R&D cooperation. In particular,
if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of
the established product, these implicit costs outweigh the gains of cooperation.
These gains consist not only of reduction of expected innovation time, but also
of a reduction in capacity adjustment costs for the new product (adjustment
cost effect). We show that under R&D competition the (intertemporally op-
timal) capacity trajectory of the innovator is non-monotonous. Directly after
the new product introduction the innovator builds capacities in order to exploit
the temporary market power. After the competitor has also introduced the new
product, the innovator scraps parts of this installed capacity to keep product
prices at a sufficiently high level. The costs associated with such ’overshooting’
of capacity build-up are avoided in case of an R&D cooperation, because in
this case we observe monotone capacity adjustments on both markets after the
innovation.
Another main insight from our dynamic analysis is that the anticipation of
the addition of a substitute to the established product to the market acts as a
collusion device. If firms expect that a substitute for their current product will
be introduced, the expected return from current capacity investment decreases.
Hence, such expectations lead to lower capacities and a higher price for the
established product. This moves the price closer to the monopoly price and
increases current total industry profits compared to a situation without such an
anticipation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of
related streams of literature. The model is presented in Section 3, which is
followed by a characterization of the Markov Perfect Equilibria of the game in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the economic implications of our analysis and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Three streams of literature are related to our research. First, several studies
have analyzed the incentives for entering R&D cooperations with competitors in
oligopolistic markets. A common theme in this literature is that, whereas R&D
cooperation facilitates the innovation process, the fact that a larger number
of firms gets access to the innovation increases the intensity of product market
competition. In an influential paper Goyal and Yoshi (2003) characterize shapes
of stable R&D networks between competitors in static oligopolistic markets,
where the marginal production costs depend negatively on the number of R&D
partners. Martin (2002) considers a patent race model with spillovers for cost
saving innovations in a quantity-setting duopoly. He assumes that the innovator
provides the cost-reducing technology to the follower in exchange for a licensing
fee. He finds that for large parts of the parameter space there are no private
incentives to form R&D cooperations, which would be socially beneficial. In a
related contribution Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) consider a similar innovation
race, where it is assumed that the profits of innovators decrease with the number
4
of firms having access to the innovation. Furthermore, they assume that the
innovation becomes available to all firms a fixed period after its initial market
introduction. They find that firms have incentives to form an R&D joint venture
if total industry (flow) profits are higher if all firms have access to the innovation
compared to a scenario with only one innovator. This work has been extended
in Erkal and Piccinin (2010) by assuming free market entry and allowing for
R&D joint ventures which do not include all firms in the market.
Few contributions in this literature explicitly focus on product innovation.
One such contribution is Bourreau and Dogan (2010), who consider market
competitors who can partially cooperate. The level of cooperation determines
the fraction of product parts developed jointly, which implies that increasing
this level, on the one hand, reduces development cost for each firm, but, on the
other hand, also reduces the degree of differentiation between their products.
Furthermore, firms may reduce production costs for the parts by process R&D.
The focus of this paper lies on the complementarity between the degrees of
cooperation in product and process innovation.
Whereas the trade-off between faster innovation and lower post innovation
profits due to more intensive product market competition is also an important
aspect for the evaluation of R&D cooperations in our framework, we address
several issues that are not covered in this stream of literature so far. First, we
explicitly model the effects of R&D cooperation on the behavior on established
markets. Second, we explicity consider the implications of capacity adjustment
for pre and post innovation profitability. Third, in our dynamic setting we
explicitly capture that R&D cooperations for product innovation have a syn-
chronizing effect on market introduction dates across competitors.
The second related stream of research is the well-established literature on
capital accumulation games (see e.g. Jun and Vives 2004), where capacity in-
vestments of single-product firms engaged in oligopolistic competition have been
characterized both in the framework of open-loop Nash equilibria and Markov-
perfect Nash equilibria. As pointed out, for example, in Dockner (1992) in-
tertemporal strategic effects present in Markov Perfect Equilibria imply higher
(lower) investments compared to open-loop scenarios if the products of competi-
tors are substitutes (complements). Dawid et al. (2010) extend these consider-
ations to a setting where one competitor offers multiple products and show that
due to the intertemporal strategic effect the single product firm invests more
aggressively. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) introduce a stochastic capacity
accumulation game in discrete time to describe an evolving industry structure
and to explain persistent differences in firm size (see also Doraszelski and Pakes
(2007)). Chen (2009) provides an extension to explain the short- and long-run
effects of mergers in (near-homogeneous product) industries. Besanko et al.
(2010a) study capacity accumulation patterns in a dynamic duopoly game with
strategic uncertainty (about the rival’s cost). They find that the occurrence of
preemption races (where excess capacity is built up) and capacity coordination
(where capacities are close to cartel levels) depend on the degree of product
differentiation, investment sunkness, and capacity depreciation. Besanko et al.
(2010b) extend this model to include demand uncertainty. Our contribution ex-
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tends this stream of literature by considering multi-product firms, as well as the
effects of the (anticipation of the) introduction of new products on investment
behavior, and the analysis of R&D cooperation and competition.
Finally, this paper is related to differential game models dealing with R&D in
dynamic oligopolies. Cellini and Lambertini (2002) consider such a game where
firms over time influence the degree of differentiation of their products. They
find that this degree is higher if the number of firms is larger. Furthermore, the
existence of an R&D cartel leads to higher product differentiation. Cellini and
Lambertini (2009) consider a dynamic version of the static process innovation
model with spillovers (see d’Aspremont and Jaquemin, 1988), and, in contrast
to the static framework, find that independent of the degree of spillovers, R&D
cooperation is preferable to noncooperative R&D from both a private and a
social perspective. Furthermore, cooperative R&D efforts over time are higher
than in the fully noncooperative game. Lambertini and Mantovani (2010) study
R&D activities, process or product R&D, in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies.
They demonstrate that in a dynamic setting, the two types of innovation are
not necessarily complementary. For an analysis of the differentiated Bertrand
case with process innovation, see Cellini and Lambertini (2011). In contrast
to the present paper, these contributions mainly focus on single-product firms
and do not study the issue of incumbents who face the problem of launching
new products and have to invest/disinvest in capacity for established and new
products over time.
3 The Model
We consider a duopoly where both firms, denoted Firm A and Firm B, have
initial capacities K1f (0) (f = A,B) available for production of an established
product, denoted as product 1. At t = 0 both firms start an innovation project
aiming at the development of a new differentiated product (product 2). The
completion time of the innovation project of firm i is denoted by τi, i = A,B.
The project might be carried out independently or jointly. In the independent
case, which we will refer to as R&D competition, both firms in general have
different project completion times. The new product becomes available only
to the firm which has finished its project at that time. Completion times are
exponentially distributed with arrival rate λcomp > 0 and independent across
firms. In order to focus the analysis on the capacity dynamics of both firms,
the distribution of the project completion times is assumed to be exogenous.
Alternatively, in the case of R&D cooperation, the firms engage in a joint
innovation project, whose completion time τ coop is exponentially distributed
with arrival rate λcoop > 0. At this completion time, the new product becomes
available for both firms to produce. Since in the R&D competition case the min-
imal completion time min[τA, τB ] is exponentially distributed with arrival rate
2λcomp, we assume λcoop to be greater than or equal to this value. We interpret
λcoop − 2λcomp ≥ 0 as the degree of synergies that arise due to cooperation of
the two firms.
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In order to be able to produce positive quantities of this new product,
the firms have to build up production capacities, where initial capacities are
K2f (0) = 0, f = A,B. At the same time they can adjust their capacities for
the established product. Production capacities here involve physical capital at
production facilities as well as the specific know-how, supply chains, and distri-
bution channels. Production capacities are specific to the production of either
the established or the new product.3
It is assumed that both firms at each point in time fully exploit their pro-
duction capacities. 4 Prices are given by the linear inverse demand system
p1(t) = 1− (K1A(t) +K1B(t))− η(K2A(t) +K2B(t)), (1)
p2(t) = 1 + θ − η(K1A(t) +K1B(t))− (K2A(t) +K2B)). (2)
This type of inverse demand system can be derived from a representative con-
sumer model with a quality-augmented version of the standard quadratic utility
function (see Symeonidis (2003), Vives (1999)). The parameter η determines
the degree of horizontal differentiation, where −1 < η < 1. The parameter θ ≥ 0
measures the degree of vertical differentiation between the two products, where
it is assumed that the new product is of higher or equal quality. We assume
that production costs are linear, and for reasons of simplicity we assume that
marginal production costs for both products are normalized to zero.
Investment costs are assumed to be linear-quadratic and symmetric across
firms, i.e. C(Iif (t)) = biIif +
cIif (t)
2
2 , where Iif (t) denotes the investment of
firm f ∈ {A,B} for product i = 1, 2 at time t. The parameter bi ≥ 0 is the
unit price of capacity for good i and c > 0 is the adjustment cost parameter.
We allow for disinvestment of firms and hence Iif (t) may be any real number
for any t taking into account the non-negativity of the capacities. Investments
(or disinvestments) in capacities to produce the new product are only possible
at t if the new product has become available at some τ ≤ t. To capture this
constraint formally we define four modes of the game (see Dockner et al. (2000),
Chapter 8 for a general description of multi-mode differential games referred to
as ’Piecewise deterministic games’). The first mode, labeled as m1, corresponds
to the periods where the new product has not become available yet. In the
modes m2 and m3 the new product is available only to one of the two firms,
where in mode m2 firm A is the one that innovates first, whereas firm B is the
innovation leader in mode m3. One of these two modes always occurs under
3It could be argued that in many industries capacities built for the production of the
old product can be partly transferred to the production of the new product. Relaxing our
assumption that capacities are completely product specific along these lines would however not
alter our qualitative conclusions as long as a sufficiently large fraction of old market capacities
is lost when transferred to the production of the new product. Moreover, in the examples like
flatscreen TVs mentioned in the Introduction, the production processes for the established
and the new product are based on very different technologies. In such situations the capacities
devoted to the established product typically can hardly be transferred to the production of
the new product.
4The assumption that capacities are fully used by firms has been adopted in large parts
of the literature, see for example Goyal and Netessine (2007) for an extensive discussion and
related references.
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R&D CooperationR&D Competition
2m 2m
comp comp
1m 4m 1m 4m
coop
comp comp
3m 3m
Figure 1: Transition rates between the different modes under R&D competition
and R&D cooperation.
R&D competition in the time interval between min[τA, τB ] and max[τA, τB ].
Under R&D cooperation none of these modes can occur. Instead, with R&D
cooperation there is a direct transition from mode m1 to mode m4, where both
firms have access to the new product. Also under R&D competition mode m4
is eventually reached after the second firm has completed its innovation project.
See figure 1 for a graphical summary of these transitions.
In mathematical terms we define a Markov process m(t) on the set M :=
{m1,m2,m3,m4} with m(0) = m1 and the transition rates given in figure 1.
The restrictions on investment are then captured by the constraints
I2f (t) = 0 ∀t s.t. m(t) = m1, f = A,B.
I2B(t) = 0 ∀t s.t. m(t) = m2
I2A(t) = 0 ∀t s.t. m(t) = m3
(3)
Overall there are four relevant capacities, which evolve according to the state
dynamics
K˙if = Iif , i = 1, 2, f = A,B. (4)
with initial conditions
K1f (0) = K
ini
1f ≥ 0, K2f (0) = 0, f = A,B. (5)
Capacities have to be non-negative and are bounded above by some (large) value
K¯if , i = 1, 2, f = A,B. For simplicity no depreciation of capital is considered.
Each of the two firms chooses its investments in order to maximize its dis-
counted profits net of investment costs over an infinite horizon. Denoting by
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r > 0 the discount rate, the objective functions of the two firms are given by
Jf = IE
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt [(1− (K1A +K1B)− η(K2A +K2B))K1f + (1 + θ − η(K1A +K1B)
−(K2A +K2B))K2f − b1I1f − c
2
I21f − b2I2f −
c
2
I22f
]
dt
]
, (6)
subject to (3), (4), (5), where the expectation is taken with respect to the
stochastic process m(t).
We assume that firms use stationary Markovian feedback strategies. Put
formally, we define by I the set of all piecewise continuous5 functions from
[0, K¯1]
2 × [0, K¯2]2 ×M to R. Note that due to the fact that we have a multi-
mode game, a Markovian feedback strategy has to depend on the current states
and the current mode. The strategy space of each firm is then given by I2.
Defining a Markov-perfect equilibrium in a multi-mode game is not com-
pletely standard. For a given strategy profile (IˆjB)j=1,2 we denote as PˆA the
(stochastic) optimal control problem firm A faces if the feedback rules (Iˆ1B , Iˆ2B)
are inserted for (I1B , I2B). Note that after insertion of these strategies, the right
hand side of the state dynamics depends on the mode m(t). Following Dockner
et al. (2000) we call a control path if = (i1f , i2f ) : [0,∞) × Ξ 7→ R2, where
f ∈ {A,B}, feasible if i) if is non-anticipating with respect to the realization
of the project completion time. In the case of R&D competition this means
that if (t, τA, τB) = i˜f (t) ∀t < min[τA, τB ], if (t, τA, τB) = i˜f (t, τA) for τA =
min[τA, τB ] and t ∈ [τA, τB) and if (t, τA, τB) = i˜f (t, τB) for τB = min[τA, τB ]
and t ∈ [τB , τA) for some i˜f (.). Analogously for R&D cooperation ; ii) the piece-
wise deterministic process (K1A(.),K1B(.),K2A(.),K2B(.),m(.)) is well-defined;
iii) the constraints Kjf ≥ 0 and investment constraints (3) are satisfied with
probability 1, and iv) the objective integral is well-defined. A feasible control
path i∗A is optimal if it maximizes the objective integral within the set of all
feasible control paths. Analogously we define the optimal path i∗B .
Definition 1 A strategy profile (I∗1A, I
∗
2A, I
∗
1B , I
∗
2B) ∈ I4 is Markov-perfect equi-
librium (MPE) of the game if the following condition holds for each firm f =
A,B:
• If the feedback strategies (I∗1f , I∗2f ) are applied to the control problem Pˆf
determined by inserting (I∗1g, I
∗
2g), g 6= f , then the resulting (stochastic)
investment path (I∗1f (K1A(t; τ),K2A(t; τ),K1B(t; τ),K2B(t; τ),m(t; τ)),
I∗2f (K1A(t; τ),K2A(t; τ),K1B(t; τ),K2B(t; τ),m(t; τ))) concides with the op-
timal path i∗f (t, τ) with probability 1, where τ = (τA, τB) under R&D com-
petition and τ = τ coop under R&D cooperation.
5In the considered model the restriction of attention to piecewise continuous feedback
strategies turns out to be innocuous.
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4 Characterization of the Markov Perfect Equi-
libria
We characterize the Markov-perfect equilibria of the described dynamic capacity
game using a dynamic programming approach. As pointed out in Dockner et al.
(2000), for multi-mode games the value functions of the players depend not only
on the states, but also on the mode of the game. Formally, the value function
of firm f = A,B is a mapping Vf : [0, K¯1]
2 × [0, K¯2]×M 7→ R, where in mode
m1 the value functions only have to be determined on the subset of the state
space where K2A = K2B = 0 and in mode m2 (m3) only on the subset where
K2B = 0 (K2A = 0). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations differ between
modes. In particular in mode m1 we have under R&D competition
r Vf (K1f , 0,K1g, 0,m1) (7)
= max
I1f
[
(1− (K1A +K1B))K1f − b1I1f − c
2
I21f +
∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1f
I1f
+
∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1g
I∗1g + λ
comp (Vf (·,m2)− Vf (·,m1)) + λcomp (Vf (·,m3)− Vf (·,m1))
]
,
f, g = A,B, g 6= f,
whereas for R&D cooperation we obtain
r Vf (K1f , 0,K1g, 0,m1) (8)
= max
I1f
[
(1− (K1A +K1B))K1f − b1I1f − c
2
I21f +
∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1f
I1f
+
∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1g
I∗1g + λ
coop (Vf (·,m4)− Vf (·,m1))
]
, f, g = A,B, g 6= f.
In mode m2 we have for the innovator firm A
r VA(K1A,K2A,K1B , 0,m2) (9)
= max
I1A,I2A
[
(1− (K1A +K1B)− ηK2A)K1A
+(1 + θ −K2A − η(K1A +K1B))K2A − b1I1A − c
2
I21A − b2I2A −
c
2
I22A
+
∂VA(·,m2)
∂K1A
I1A +
∂VA(·,m2)
∂K1B
I∗1B +
∂VA(·,m2)
∂K2A
I2A + λ
comp (VA(·,m4)− VA(·,m2))
]
and for the laggard firm B
r VB(K1A,K2A,K1B , 0,m2) (10)
= max
I1B
[
(1− (K1A +K1B)− ηK2A)K1B − b1I1B − c
2
I21B
+
∂VB(·,m2)
∂K1A
I∗1A +
∂VB(·,m2)
∂K1B
I1B +
∂VB(·,m2)
∂K2A
I∗2A +λ
comp (VB(·,m4)− VB(·,m2))
]
.
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Symmetric equations arise in mode m3, where firm B is the innovator and firm
A is the laggard. Finally, in mode m4 the HJB-equation reads
r Vf (K1A,K2A,K1B ,K2B ,m4) (11)
= max
I1f ,I2f
[
(1− (K1A +K1B)− η(K2A +K2B))K1f
+(1 + θ − (K2A +K2B)− η(K1A +K1B))K2f − b1I1f − c
2
I21f − b2I2f −
c
2
I22f
+
∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K1f
I1f +
∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K1g
I∗1g +
∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K2f
I2f +
∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K2g
I∗2g
]
,
f, g = A,B, f 6= g.
Considering the first order conditions, it follows directly from these equations
that the equilibrium investment strategies are of the form
I∗if (K,m) =
1
c
(
∂Vf (K,m)
∂Kif
− bi
)
i = 1, 2, f = A,B, m ∈M,
with K = (K1A,K2A,K1B ,K2B). Since the game is symmetric with respect to
the two firms, we will concentrate on the characterization of symmetric Markov-
perfect equilibria. Due to the linear quadratic structure of the game the follow-
ing form for the value functions can be assumed:
Vf (K,m4) = α
4 + β4K1f + χ
4K1g + 
4K2f + φ
4K2g + ϕ
4K21f + γ
4K21g
+ι4K22f + κ
4K22g + µ
4K1fK1g + ν
4K1fK2f + σ
4K1fK2g
+ω4K1gK2f + ψ
4K1gK2g + ξ
4K2fK2g,
VA(K1A,K2A,K1B , 0,m2) = α
2
A + β
2
AK1A + χ
2
AK1B + 
2
AK2A + ϕ
2
AK
2
1A + γ
2
AK
2
1B
+ι2AK
2
2A + µ
2
AK1AK1B + ν
2
AK1AK2A + ω
2
AK1BK2A,
VB(K1A,K2A,K1B , 0,m2) = α
2
B + β
2
BK1B + χ
2
BK1A + φ
2
BK2A + ϕ
2
BK
2
1B + γ
2
BK
2
1A
+κ2BK
2
2A + µ
2
BK1AK1B + ψ
2
BK1AK2A + σ
2
BK1BK2A,
Vf (K1A,K2A, 0, 0,m1) = α
1 + β1K1f + χ
1K1g + ϕ
1K21f + γ
1K21g + µ
1K1AK1B ,
with f, g = A,B, f 6= g. The value functions in mode m3 are completely
symmetric to those in mode m2 with reversed firm roles and α
3
f = α
2
g, β
3
f =
β2g , . . . for f, g = A,B, f 6= g.
In order to determine the coefficients of these value functions we follow
a standard approach by inserting the equilibrium investment rules and the
quadratic value functions for the different modes into the HJB-equations. In
particular, for the case of R&D competition the value functions for all four
modes are inserted into (7) and (9) - (11), whereas for the case of R&D cooper-
ation the value functions for modes m1 and m4 are inserted into (8) and (11).
Comparing the coefficients of the capital stock terms of different degrees yields
41 nonlinear equations in 41 unknows under R&D competition and 21 nonlin-
ear equations in 21 unknowns under R&D cooperation. Solving these systems
is facilitated by the fact that they can be solved recursively, starting with mode
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m4 and then proceeding to modes m2 and m1. In all results to be presented
below it has been checked that (globally) stable steady states exist in all modes,
which implies that transversality conditions are satisfied.
5 Economic Analysis
In what follows we address the economic questions posed in the Introduction by
carrying out a numerical analysis. We depart from the following default set of
parameters
λcomp = 0.05, λcoop = 0.1, θ = 0, b1 = b2 = 0, c = 5, r = 0.04,
where we will present robustness checks of the qualitative findings with respect
to variations of these parameters at the end of the section. Without loss of
generality we always assume that the price of capital is normalized to zero, i.e.
bi = 0. In the default setting we have λ
coop = 2λcomp, which means that we con-
sider the case without R&D synergies. Results differ qualitatively between the
cases where the new product is a substitute or a complement to the established
product. Hence, we always separately discuss results for positive (η = 0.5) and
negative (η = −0.5) values of the degree of horizontal differentiation. In the
default setting we consider the case where the new product is of equal quality to
the established one (θ = 0), in subsection 5.4 we show that results change only
marginally if the new product is assumed to be also vertically differentiated.
5.1 Capacity dynamics
In all the analyses, the initial levels of the capital stocks of the established prod-
uct are set to the steady state levels arising in the Markov-perfect equilibrium
of the standard capital accumulation game where both firms produce only the
established product forever. In some of our discussion below we will refer to this
capacity level as the no-innovation benchmark. Setting such initial conditions
can be interpreted in a way that before the start of the R&D project(s) firms
ignored the possibility of new products being introduced into the market.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium dynamics of the four capital stocks with
R&D competition under the assumptions that innovations occur exactly at their
expected time and that firm A is the first innovator. After the new product is
introduced by firm A, the investment patterns differ substantially between the
cases of substitutes and complements. If the new product is a substitute the
innovator reduces investment in the established product. Also the innovation
laggard does so directly after the introduction of the new product. This is caused
by the increased competition on the market, since the introduction of the new
product reduces the price of the established product for a given quantity. The
innovator has an additional incentive to reduce quantities of the established
product, because this increases the price of the new product. Once the new
product is also introduced by firm B (t > τB) capital stocks quickly converge to
symmetric steady state. Due to the absence of vertical differentiation (θ = 0)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics of the four capital stocks under R&D competi-
tion (a) if the new product is a substitute, (b) if the new product is a complement
of the established product.
the steady state levels of both products coincide. It should be noted that the
dynamics of the capital stocks of firm A have a non-monotone pattern. During
the period where this firm is the only producer of the new product (τA < t < τB),
it increases its capacity for the new product and decreases that of the established
product. After the introduction of the new product by firm B, exactly the
opposite dynamics arise. Firm A reduces K2A and increases K1A. This is
a reaction to i) the increase in new product capacity of its competitor, which
reduces the price of the new product, and ii) the decrease of K1B , which provides
incentives for firm A to expand capacity on the established market. In this way
the sequential introduction of the new product by the two firms creates an
overshooting pattern of production capacities of firm A.
In the case of complements, the introduction of the new product triggers
an increase in the capacity investments of the established products. This is
because the introduction of the new product creates additional demand for the
established product. The symmetric steady state reached after the introduction
of the new product by firm B in this case induces a larger capacity for the
established product than in the no-innovation benchmark. Like in the case
of substitutes, overshooting occurs with respect to the capital stocks of the
innovator firm A. In the complements case the capacities for both products
increase between τA and τB and then decrease after the introduction of the new
product by firm B.
In addition to these general patterns two observations should be stressed,
which genuinely rely on the intertemporal considerations of the firms. These
two effects are illustrated in figure 3, where the dynamics of the capacity and the
instantaneous payoff of the laggard firm B in modes m1 and m2 are shown, i.e.
for all t < τB . First, it can be seen that starting the R&D projects influences
the capacity levels for the established product even before the new product is
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introduced. We refer to this as the anticipation effect. In particular, if the
anticipated new product is a substitute the firm invests less. The reason is, that
the firm takes into account that after the introduction of the new product the
revenue generated by one unit of capital stock of the established product will
decrease. This reduces the value of the capital stock already before the new
product arrives. Hence, the firms invest less in mode m1 compared to the no-
innovation benchmark. Due to this underinvestment the price of the established
product moves closer to the monopoly price and the instantaneous payoffs of
both firms go up compared to the no-innovation benchmark6.
If the new product is a complement for the established product, then its
anticipated introduction has a positive effect on the value of the established
product’s capital stock. Therefore, firms invest more (prior to the product
introduction) compared to the no-innovation benchmark. This leads to lower
prices and lower instantaneous payoffs.
The second dynamic effect arises in mode m2. As can be seen in panel (b)
of figure 3 the instantaneous payoffs of firm B in mode m2, where firm A (but
not firm B) already offers the new product, settle down at a level above the
no-innovation benchmark. This holds true both for the cases of substitutes and
complements. Whereas it is intuitively understandable that the introduction
of a complementary product also increases the payoffs of the laggard, this ob-
servation is at first sight counter-intuitive for the substitute case. This result
is driven by an intertemporal strategic incentive emerging from the feedback
structure of the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Firm B takes into account that
an increase in K1B induces a reduction of the future investments of firm A in
both of its capital stocks. The resulting reduction in K1A and K2A leads to an
increase in the price of the established product, which increases the payoff of
firm B. The fact that firm A has two capital stocks makes the intertemporal
strategic incentives for firm A smaller and for firm B larger compared to the
no-innovation benchmark. This asymmetry generates the relatively high payoffs
of the laggard (see also Dawid et al. (2010)).
Having discussed the main properties of the dynamics emerging under R&D
competition we now turn to the case of R&D cooperation. Since both firms
introduce the new product at the same time τ coop, the trajectories of both
capital stocks are symmetric across firms. Figure 4 shows the developments of
both capital stocks over time. Overall, it can be seen that after the introduction
of the new product both capital stocks quickly converge to the steady-state of
mode m4.
Comparing the dynamics with that under R&D competition we see that the
size of the anticipation effect in mode m1 is larger under R&D cooperation than
under competition. The reason is that under R&D cooperation the change of the
value of the established product’s capital stock due to the anticipated innovation
is larger. In the case of substitutes we get a larger reduction in the value for the
6Although we only depict capacity and payoffs of firm B here, identical statements hold
for firm A, because in mode m1 the two firms act completely symmetrically.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium dynamics of the capital stock on the established market
(a) and instantaneous payoffs for firm B (b) under R&D competition (solid line:
substitutes; dashed line: complements).
following two reasons. On the one hand, under R&D cooperation both firms
introduce the new product at τ coop which implies a stronger price decrease for
the established product compared to R&D competition, where only one firm
introduces at the time when the new product first reaches the market. On the
other hand, under R&D cooperation for each firm the expected time until it
introduces the new product is lower than under competition. Once the firm
offers both products, the value of the established product’s capital stock further
decreases due to a cannibalization effect. Analogous arguments show that in
the case of complements the overinvestment is larger under R&D cooperation
because the value of the established product’s capital stock increases more under
R&D cooperation compared to R&D competition. It should be noted that the
presence of synergies enhances the difference in the size of the anticipation
effect between the cases of R&D cooperation and R&D competition, because
the expected time to the new product introduction is then shorter under R&D
cooperation.
Also after the introduction of the new products there are qualitative differ-
ences in the dynamics between the two R&D scenarios. Contrary to the case
of R&D competition, under cooperation there is no overshooting of capacities
and all capital stocks approach the long run steady state monotonously. Con-
sequently, total capital adjustments costs are smaller under R&D cooperation.
5.2 Incentives for R&D cooperation
In order to examine the incentives of firms to engage in R&D cooperation, we
consider in Figure 5 the relative difference of the value functions of the firms
under R&D competition and under R&D cooperation evaluated at the initial
capital stocks. It can be clearly seen that in the absence of synergies there is
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Figure 4: Equilibrium dynamics of the capital stocks on both markets under
R&D cooperation for the case of substitutes (a) and complements (b).
no incentive to cooperate for almost all values of the horizontal differentiation
parameter η. This is quite remarkable given that we do not assume that co-
operation induces any explicit costs for the firms. Furthermore, it can be seen
that the relative advantage of R&D competition crucially depends on the de-
gree of horizontal differentiation. In particular R&D cooperation is attractive
if the new product is either a close substitute or a strong complement to the
established product.
To explain these observations three effects have to be considered. First, as
already discussed above, the anticipation effect is stronger under cooperation
than under competition. For complements this results in lower payoffs under
cooperation in mode m1, whereas for substitutes it is the other way round. As
can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 6, where the established product’s capacity in
the steady state of mode m1 is depicted, the size of the anticipation effect and of
the resulting difference between R&D cooperation and competition is larger for
complements than for substitutes and increases substantially as η approaches -1.
This is quite intuitive, because the anticipation of a strong complement to the
established product induces an increased price expectation for the established
product. Therefore, the value of the capacity of that product increases more
substantially leading to stronger overinvestment.
Second, an important implication of R&D cooperation is that the introduc-
tion of the new product is synchronized among the two firms. We refer to this
as the synchronization effect. It implies that immediately after the innovation
there is duopolistic competition also on the market for the new product. Under
R&D competition there is always a time interval, where only one firm is active
on the new market. During this interval the innovator is gaining a relatively
high payoff due to its market power with respect to the new product. The
laggard, however, is worse off than it would be in a situation where both firms
introduce the new product simultaneously. Ex-ante firms do not know which
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Figure 5: The relative difference in game values between R&D competition and
R&D cooperation when no synergies from cooperation are present .
will be the first innovator, however the expected market profit (net of capital
adjustment costs) under R&D competition in the time interval between the two
innovation times is higher than in the duopolistic scenario under R&D cooper-
ation. This is an implication of the fact that industry profits are larger under
monopoly than under duopoly. Panel (b) of figure 6 illustrates this observation.
It compares the average instantaneous payoff of a firm in the steady states of
modes m2 and m3 with its payoff in the steady state of mode m4. It should be
noted that in the steady state no capacity investments occur, which means that
investment costs are irrelevant. It can be clearly seen that in the considered
range of the degree of horizontal differentiation indeed the average payoff in the
steady states of the asymmetric modes under R&D competition is larger than
the steady state payoff in mode m4, where both firms offer the new product.
Furthermore, the relative difference increases as η becomes smaller.
The third effect is denoted as the adjustment cost effect. It arises from the
difference in the capital adjustment patterns between the two R&D scenarios.
As discussed above, overshooting of the capacities on both markets of the in-
novation leader arises under R&D competition, whereas no such phenomenon
occurs under R&D cooperation. For this reason expected capital adjustment
costs are larger in the R&D competition case. Furthermore, it follows from the
discussion above that this effect is more pronounced if the new product is a
(strong) complement of the established product.
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Figure 6: (a) Capital stocks in the steady of mode m1 under R&D cooperation
(bold) and R&D competition (solid); (b) Difference between average instanta-
neous payoffs in the steady state of modes m2/m3 under R&D competition and
the steady state of mode m4 under R&D cooperation.
Considering figure 5 we conclude that the synchronization effect (plus the
anticipation effect in case of complements), which favors R&D competition, is
dominant. Avoiding synchronization of the time of the introduction of the new
product enhances expected market profits to a sufficient degree so that the
extra adjustment costs are more than compensated. Consequently, firms should
decide for R&D competition in the absence of synergies.
5.3 Impact of R&D synergies
In the discussion so far it was assumed that R&D cooperation does not generate
any synergies in the sense that the expected time until the new product can be
first introduced to the market is the same under R&D cooperation and R&D
competition. As mentioned in the Introduction, empirical work suggests that
cooperation between different firms in the market might lead to synergies in the
R&D activities of these firms. In our model positive synergies are captured by
assuming that λcoop > 2λcomp holds. In the case of such positive synergies, a
fourth effect is added to the three effects just discussed. Under synergies the
expected time span until the first introduction of the new product is shorter
under R&D cooperation and hence firms expect the corresponding increase in
their instantaneous payoffs to occur earlier. This makes R&D cooperation more
attractive. We refer to this effect as the synergy effect.
To explore this issue more deeply, we define by λ∗ the minimal value of
the innovation arrival rate such that the firms’ value functions under R&D
cooperation exceed that of R&D competition for all λcoop ≥ λ∗. In figure 7
this threshold value is depicted for varying degrees of horizontal differentiation
and compared to the value 2λcomp corresponding to no synergies. Consistent
with our discussion above, we observe that for all values of η apart from the
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Figure 7: The threshold value λ∗ for varying degree of horizontal differentiation
.
extreme degrees of differentiation positive synergies are needed to make R&D
cooperation attractive. Since the payoff increase resulting from the introduction
of the new product is larger for complements than for substitutes, the synergy
effect is more pronounced for negative values of η. Hence, as confirmed in the
figure, particularly high synergies are needed if the two products are (not too
strong) substitutes. The reason that only weak synergies are needed to make
R&D cooperation attractive in the case of close substitutes is that in such a
scenario the synchronization effect becomes very small. The sole producer of
the new product has very little market power because the new product is almost
homogeneous to the established one. The relatively low values of λ∗ for values
of η close to -1 are due to the strength of the adjustment cost effect in the case
of strong complements.
5.4 Robustness
Our discussion of the different qualitative effects resulting from the choice be-
tween R&D cooperation and R&D competition has been based on a particular
parameter constellation. It is important to check robustness of the qualitative
statements with respect to variations of the key parameters of the model. Such
a sensitivity check has been carried out and to illustrate the robustness of our
results we depict in figure 8 the changes in the λ∗ curve if the discount rate, the
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Figure 8: Effect of the changes in the discount rate (a), the capital adjustment
cost parameter (b) and the vertical differentiation parameter (c) on the arrival
rate threshold λ∗.
capital adjustment cost parameter and the degree of vertical differentiation is
varied.
It can be seen that the qualitative features of this curve, in particular the
inverse U-shape and the requirement for positive synergies for almost the entire
range of η values, stay intact. The fact that higher discounting moves the
curve downwards can be explained by the increased relevance of the synergy
effect. The expected reduction of the arrival time of the innovation caused by
an increase of the arrival rate is valued more if the discount rate is higher.
Hence, a smaller advantage with respect to the arrival rate is needed to make
R&D cooperation as attractive as competition. Also an increase in the capital
adjustment costs leads to a downward shift of the curve, because the adjustment
cost effect, which favors R&D cooperation, becomes more pronounced. Finally,
it can be seen that an increase in the level of vertical differentiation of the new
product does not seriously affect the threshold value λ∗.
20
5.5 Welfare Effects
To conclude our analysis we briefly consider the welfare7 implications of R&D
cooperation. Intuition suggests that at any point in time in mode m1, prior
to the introduction of the new product, an increase of the total quantity of the
established product, relative to the no-innovation benchmark, is welfare enhanc-
ing. The deviation of the output from the no-innovation benchmark in m1 stems
from the anticipation effect and, as discussed above, this effect is stronger under
R&D cooperation than under R&D competition. If the new product is a substi-
tute of the established one, this reasoning implies that R&D cooperation has a
negative effect on (instantaneous) welfare, whereas R&D cooperation is welfare
enhancing if the new product is a complement. Considering the modes after
the innovation, it is easy to see that welfare in modes m2 and m3, where only
one firm offers both products, is smaller than in mode m4, where both firms
offer both products. This is due to larger total output and smaller capacity
adjustment costs in mode m4. Since R&D cooperation leads to a direct transi-
tion from m1 to m4, (instantaneous) welfare after the introduction of the new
product is always larger under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition.
These qualitative statements have been confirmed by numerical analysis. This
analysis also shows that for the parameter settings considered above, in the case
of substitutes the negative welfare effects of R&D cooperation prior to innova-
tion is dominated by the positive effects after innovation such that also in the
absence of synergies the discounted welfare stream under R&D cooperation is
larger than under competition regardless of the degree of differentiation. In case
of complements R&D cooperation increases welfare before and after the inno-
vation. Therefore, also in the complements case the effect of R&D cooperation
on the discounted welfare stream is clearly positive.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the interplay between capacity dynamics and technological
progress in an oligopolistic market. We focus on product innovation and study
how anticipated and actual introduction of new products influence market dy-
namics. In particular, we characterize the implications of R&D cooperations
in product innovations on the investment behavior of established firms in an
industry. We identify three effects which influence the relative profitability of
R&D cooperation: the anticipation effect, the synchronization effect, and the
adjustment cost effect. We show that the sign and the size of these effects de-
pend on the degree of product differentiation. We find that, although R&D
competition is associated with overshooting of the capacity dynamics for both
products and, in case of substitutes also leads to smaller firm profits than R&D
cooperation prior to the innovation date, still firms prefer not to to cooporate
in R&D in the absence of sufficiently strong synergy effects. Given that R&D
cooperation is preferred from a welfare perspective, these insights call for policy
7As usual we define welfare as the sum of total industry profit and consumer surplus.
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measures stimulating R&D cooperation.
In order to concentrate the analysis on capacity investment dynamics we
have assumed in this paper that innovation arrival rates are exogenously given.
Therefore, an important extension is to introduce knowledge stocks of the firms
into the analysis, which can be increased by R&D investments, and to assume
that arrival rates depend on knowledge stocks (see e.g. Doraszelski (2003)).
Since such a formulation leads to a differential game which does not have a
linear quadratic structure, numerical methods like collocation will have to be
employed in such an analysis. An important issue that can be addressed in
such a setting is the impact of market share on the established market on the
incentives to invest in product innovation.
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